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RENT CONTROL AND RENT 
STABILIZATION AS FORMS OF 
REGULATORY AND PHYSICAL TAKINGS 
Christina McDonough* 
Abstract: The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohib-
its the government’s taking of private property without adequate compen-
sation. Rent controls and rent stabilization unduly burden property own-
ers by depriving them of market rate rental revenue. Furthermore, these 
methods of producing artificially low rents are often ineffective, failing to 
alleviate the financial hardships of the programs’ intended beneficiaries. 
Due to these dual aspects of rent control and rent stabilization programs— 
as well as by analogizing the programs to more classically recognized forms 
of regulatory takings, such as where the government deprives a property 
owner of all reasonable uses of his land—this Note reasons that rent con-
trol and rent stabilization measures also constitute unconstitutional tak-
ings. 
Introduction 
 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. overruled more than twenty years of 
regulatory takings analysis by declaring that a regulation’s ability to sub-
stantially advance its stated purpose was improperly analyzed under a 
regulatory takings claim.1 Prior to Lingle, courts had often declared 
regulatory takings unconstitutional when they failed to advance their 
stated goal.2 Instead of a “substantially advances” analysis, the Court de-
clared a better analysis to examine the burden placed on an individual 
by a regulation.3 The Court determined that when a burden is unduly 
high, the regulation is unconstitutional.4 In order to assess the burden 
imposed by the regulation, the character of the government action is to 
be scrutinized.5 
                                                                                                                      
* Symposium Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2006–07. 
1 544 U.S. 528, 528–29 (2005). 
2 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). 
3 Lingle, 544 U.S. 538–39. 
4 See id. 
5 Id. 
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 Rent controls have been particularly affected by the recent devel-
opments in regulatory takings jurisprudence.6 Under a “substantially 
advances” analysis, rent controls were on the cusp of extinction.7 Rent 
controls often fail to provide affordable housing for low income indi-
viduals.8 Instead, they provide a flood of under-priced apartments for 
middle- to high-income individuals.9 
 Part I of this Note discusses the background of the Fifth Amend-
ment’s Takings Clause. Part II examines the status of rent controls un-
der a physical takings analysis, and also how rent controls have histori-
cally been analyzed under regulatory takings. Part III considers how 
numerous state court decisions on the constitutionality of rent controls 
as a regulatory taking would differ after Lingle. Finally, Part IV discusses 
many of the problems with the Lingle decision, particularly the ambigu-
ity of the “character of the government action” prong. This Part argues 
that the “character of the government action” test can act as a proxy for 
the “substantially advances” inquiry. In effect, the Lingle standard could 
assume a similar shape to the older “substantially advances” analysis. 
Viewed through this angle, rent controls could still be declared uncon-
stitutional in a post-Lingle world. 
I. Background of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause 
 A. The Fifth Amendment and Regulatory Takings 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the 
taking of private property, either physically or by regulation, for public 
use without just compensation.10 In physical takings, the government is 
deemed to have physically occupied the land, “whether the govern-
ment is itself the occupier or enacts a law that allows third-party occu-
pation.”11 Therefore, land is considered taken when the landowner 
“has no power to exclude the occupier from possession and use of the 
space.”12 The “power to exclude” is a revered and fundamental right 
                                                                                                                      
6 See Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 546 (1924). 
7 R.S. Radford, Why Rent Control Is Still a Regulatory Taking, ExpressO Preprint Series 
(Working Paper No. 552) 1, 4 (2005), available at http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/ 
552. 
8 See id. at 3. 
9 Id. 
10 See U.S. Const. amend. V.; Lingle, 544 U.S. at 536. 
11 Greystone Hotel Co. v. City of New York, 13 F. Supp. 2d 524, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
12 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982). 
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within “an owner’s bundle of property rights.”13 The Fifth Amendment 
explicitly protects this right to exclude.14 Therefore, any government 
action which violates this right is unconstitutional.15 
 Unlike physical takings, regulatory takings do not require the gov-
ernment’s actual occupation of property. 16 Instead, a regulation effects 
a taking when it goes “too far.”17 A regulation is often found to have 
gone too far when the regulation targets an individual property owner, 
requiring him to bear a burden that would be more appropriately 
shared by the public.18 In ascertaining if an individual is inappropri-
ately burdened, three factors are examined: (1) the “regulation’s im-
pact on the claimant;” (2) “the extent to which it interferes with dis-
tinct investment backed expectations;” and (3) “the character of the 
government action.”19 The first and second of these factors together 
determine whether the claimant is left with an economically viable use 
of his land.20 
 This test for a regulatory taking is relatively new, established in 
2005.21 More than twenty years ago the Supreme Court announced a 
different test.22 In Agins v. City of Tiburon, the Court determined that a 
regulatory taking occurred whenever the law fails “to substantially ad-
vance legitimate state interests . . . or denies an owner economically 
viable use of his land.”23 This “substantially advances” test would only be 
satisfied when the regulation successfully achieved its stated goal.24 
However, in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., the Supreme Court ruled that 
“the ‘substantially advances’ formula is not a valid method of identify-
ing compensable regulatory takings.”25 Instead, the Court found that 
claims that a regulation failed to substantially advance its stated pur-
                                                                                                                      
13 Id. 
14 See id. 
15 See id. 
16 Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987). 
17 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
18 See Penn Cent. Transp. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123–25 (1978). 
19 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538–39 (2005). 
20 See id.; Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Council, 535 U.S. 303, 
335 (2002); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 632 (2001) (holding that land was not 
deprived of all economic value where the land still retained “significant worth for con-
struction of a residence”); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (hold-
ing that a taking occurs where “regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive 
use of land”). 
21 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538–39. 
22 See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 529. 
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pose were due process claims, not regulatory takings claims.26 Takings 
analyses must be focused on the burden placed on the property owner 
through the regulation, and not on whether the regulation accom-
plished its broader societal goals. 27 
B. Fifth Amendment Takings and Rent Control 
 Rent control is a recurring theme in physical and regulatory tak-
ings cases.28 It is often argued that rent controls are a form of physical 
or regulatory takings.29 Rent control is the means by which the gov-
ernment places a ceiling on the amount that a landlord can charge 
tenants.30 The Supreme Court has explicitly stated that rent control is 
designed to “protect persons with relatively fixed and limited incomes, 
consumers, [and] wage earners . . . from undue impairment of their 
standard of living . . . .”31 With only one exception, the Supreme Court 
has uniformly held that rent controls are constitutional, creating nei-
ther a physical nor a regulatory taking.32 Rent controls have been up-
held because they do not force an individual to become a landlord.33 
The rent controls merely place a ceiling on the amount of rent a land-
lord can charge once he has personally decided to accept a tenant.34 
Courts have found that it is properly within a state’s police power to 
create and enforce such a regulation.35 
II. Supreme Court Precedent 
 In Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, the Supreme Court found that rent 
controls constitute a regulatory taking.36 In Chastleton, the Court over-
turned rent controls because the purpose for the control ceased to ex-
ist.37 The control at issue was enacted during World War I in order to 
                                                                                                                      
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 See Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 546 (1924). 
29 Id. 
30 Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 513 (1944). 
31 Id. 
32 Id.; Chastleton, 264 U.S. at 547–48. 
33 Chastleton, 264 U.S. at 547–48. 
34 See id. 
35 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 440 (1982) (“States 
have broad power to regulate housing conditions in general and the landlord-tenant rela-
tionship in particular without paying compensation for all economic injuries that such 
regulation entails.”). 
36 264 U.S. at 549. 
37 Id. at 548. 
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make suitable housing more available during wartime.38 After the war 
ended, the controls were no longer justified.39 Interestingly, the Court 
found that when a law is passed in response to wartime conditions, and 
those conditions cease, not even an increased cost of living justifies the 
maintenance of rent control.40 Moreover, the Court acknowledged the 
landowner’s right to set rent as an “ordinarily existing private right[]” 
and that only extenuating circumstances such as a war could allow ter-
mination of that right.41 Interference with that right for more minor 
reasons could constitute an infringement of landowners’ Fifth 
Amendment rights.42 
 Even though Chastleton preceded Agins v. City of Tiburon, the Chas-
tleton Court applied a “substantially advances” test.43 The price control 
in Chastleton would be allowed so long as its effect was to accomplish 
the control’s purpose of keeping rental values down during wartime.44 
A. Rent Controls and Physical Takings 
 The more recent case of Yee v. City of Escondido accurately reflects 
the Supreme Court’s sentiment that rent controls do not pose constitu-
tional difficulties, at least with regard to physical takings.45 Yee involved 
a combination of termination and rent control clauses concerning mo-
bile homes.46 Under the California Mobile Home Residency Law, a 
mobile home park owner may only terminate a tenant’s lease due to 
either delinquency in rental payments or the park owner’s wish to put 
the land to another use.47 Furthermore, should a tenant sell his mobile 
home, the park owner may not evict the new mobile home owner dur-
ing or after the sale.48 This state law was coupled with a local Escondido 
rent control ordinance mandating that the rent in mobile home parks 
not rise above 1986 rent levels.49 The owners of the mobile home parks 
contended that the combination of these two laws effectuated a physi-
                                                                                                                      
38 Id. at 545, 548. 
39 Id. at 548. 
40 Id. (noting that “if . . . all that remains of war conditions is the increased cost of liv-
ing that is not in itself a justification of the [rent controls]”). 
41 Id. at 546. 
42 See Chastleton, 264 U.S. at 548. 
43 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); Chastleton, 264 U.S. at 549. 
44 Chastleton, 264 U.S. at 549. 
45 See 503 U.S. 519, 519 (1992). 
46 Id. 
47 Cal. Civ. Code § 796 (West 1982); Yee, 503 U.S. at 519. 
48Yee, 503 U.S. at 519. 
49 Id. 
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cal taking.50 They reasoned that because California law would not allow 
them to evict new tenants, the law essentially created perpetual ten-
ants.51 Such behavior was analogous to an actual physical takeover of 
the land by the government; the mobile park owners were deprived of 
all control over their land.52 They could no longer choose their incom-
ing tenants, evict current tenants, or set the lease prices.53 
 The Supreme Court rejected this argument, finding that while 
such an abrogation of landlord rights may be relevant for a regulatory 
takings claim, it was not relevant for a physical takings claim—the only 
claim presented in the case.54 The Court found that no physical taking 
had occurred because it was the owners of the mobile park, not the 
government, who made the decision to rent the land to tenants.55 The 
original tenants were “invited by the [park owners]” and were not 
forced upon the park owners by the government.56 Furthermore, while 
the Court acknowledged the idea that the right to exclude was a fun-
damental right of property owners, the Escondido rent control did not 
inhibit that right for two reasons: (1) the park owners had voluntarily 
invited tenants onto their land; and (2) if they wished to exclude ten-
ants, they could do so by merely changing the use of the land.57 
 The Yee Court focused on the fact that the park owners had first 
decided to open their land to tenants, and that this decision was inde-
pendent of any government regulation or intervention.58 Therefore, 
the Court found that after choosing to open its doors, the park owners 
did not have the right to select their tenants at will, free from govern-
ment regulation.59 
B. Recent Supreme Court Interpretations of Rent Controls  
as Regulatory Takings 
 The dissenting opinion in Pennell v. City of San Jose is significant be-
cause it established instances in which rent control would be considered 
                                                                                                                      
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 526–27. 
52 Id. In essence, the combination of the laws vests in tenants “the right to occupy the 
land indefinitely at a submarket rent . . . .” Id. at 527. 
53 Id. 
54 See Yee, 503 U.S. at 527–28. 
55 Id. at 529. 
56 Id. at 528. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 531. 
59 See id. 
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unconstitutional regulatory takings.60 In that case, a rent control ordi-
nance was in place in order to prevent excessively high rents in the city 
of San Jose.61 The rent control ordinance contained a provision allowing 
the landlord to request a rent increase.62 Upon receiving a rent increase 
request, a San Jose city official would examine certain objective factors 
to determine if the rent increase was “reasonable,” or excessive and in 
violation of the rent control laws.63 In addition to these objective factors, 
the officer would also consider one subjective factor: the amount of 
“hardship to tenant” that would result from the rent increase.64 This fac-
tor would account for a tenant’s ability to pay the rent, without consider-
ing whether the rent increase was objectively reasonable.65 
 While the majority found no evidence to suggest that the “hard-
ship to tenant” factor had ever affected a rental amount,66 thus find-
ing the case premature, two justices disagreed.67 Not only did the two 
justices determine that the issue was ripe, they also found that the 
“hardship to tenant” provision constituted a regulatory taking because 
it “imposes a public burden on individual landlords.”68 
 The dissent first recognized that rent controls do not normally con-
stitute a regulatory taking because landowners generally contribute to 
the social problem of excessively high rents.69 Therefore, rent controls 
do not unfairly single out such property owners, since these very prop-
erty owners are the ones creating the problem.70 However, when the 
rent is dropped below a “reasonable rent” merely because the tenant 
cannot afford to pay reasonable rent, then the landlords are being sin-
gled out and forced to personally subsidize these individuals.71 While 
the landlords may have contributed to the problem of excessively high 
rents, they did not contribute to the plight of individuals who cannot 
afford “reasonable rents.”72 Therefore, “the city is not ‘regulating’ rents 
                                                                                                                      
60 485 U.S. 1, 16–18 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The 
majority opinion determined it was premature to consider the appellants claims under the 
Takings Clause. Id. at 15 (majority opinion). 
61 Id. at 4–5 (majority opinion). 
62 Id. at 5. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 6. 
65 Id. 
66 Pennell, 485 U.S. at 9–10. 
67 Id. at 14–15 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
68 Id. at 15–16. 
69 Id. at 20–21. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 22. 
72 Pennell, 485 U.S. at 22. 
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in the relevant sense of preventing rents that are excessive; rather it is 
using the occasion of rent regulation to establish a welfare program pri-
vately funded by those landlords who happen to have ‘hardship’ ten-
ants.”73 By forcing these landlords to shoulder the burden of subsidizing 
the poorer members of society, the San Jose rent ordinance required 
these landowners to “alone bear a public burden, which in all fairness 
and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”74 Even though 
this was a dissenting opinion, it does illustrate that forcing landowners 
to subsidize the poor or shoulder any problem which they did not create 
could be unconstitutional.75 Interestingly, one of the authors of this dis-
senting opinion was Justice O’Connor, who returned in 2005 to write 
the majority opinion in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.76 Her dissent in Pen-
nell laid the foundation for her Lingle argument that a regulatory taking 
must focus on the burden imposed on the property owner.77 
III. State Cases Interpreting the Constitutionality  
of Rent Controls 
 Aside from the Supreme Court cases, a large number of rent con-
trol jurisprudence springs from New York, due to the state’s extensive 
use of rent control. New York’s highest court, the Court of Appeals, has 
provided an illustrative example of a rent control rising to the level of a 
regulatory taking.78 In Manocherian v. Lenox Hill Hospital, the plaintiff 
challenged the constitutionality of a New York law that required apart-
ment owners to offer renewal leases on rent-stabilized apartments to 
not-for-profit hospitals.79 The apartments were used to house some of 
the hospital’s employees.80 This law was found unconstitutional for fail-
ing the valid public purpose prong under the old regulatory takings 
test from Agins v. City of Tiburon.81 The court found that New York’s rent 
control measures were aimed at protecting renters “who could not 
compete in an overheated rental market, through no fault of their 
own.”82 The rent control laws were broad, with their scope encompass-
                                                                                                                      
73 Id. 
74 See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
75 Pennell, 485 U.S. at 22–23 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
76 544 U.S. 528 (2005); Pennell, 485 U.S. at 22–23. 
77 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 529; Pennell, 485 U.S. at 22–23. 
78See generally Manocherian v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 643 N.E.2d 479 (N.Y. 1994). 
79 Id. at 480. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 484. 
82 Id. at 480. 
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ing all people during New York’s acute housing shortage.83 However, 
the scope of the not-for-profit hospital provisions was not as broad, only 
encompassing employees of not-for-profit hospitals.84 Such a housing 
subsidy was more similar to a valuable employment perk than a means 
of effectuating the valid state purpose of providing housing during a 
statewide shortage.85 Therefore, this law actually required owners who 
had previously rented to hospitals to subsidize an employment perk.86 
The court found that this law was unconstitutional not only due to a 
lack of a valid public purpose, but also because it singled out certain 
property owners to shoulder a burden that was not related to the gen-
eral problem of excessively high rents in New York City.87 
 Moreover, the court distinguished this case from Yee v. City of Escon-
dido by first asserting that Yee was concerned with a physical, not a regu-
latory, taking.88 In addition, the holding in Yee related to a rent control 
that applied uniformly to all mobile homes, not merely to a disparate 
subset, as in Manocherian.89 Therefore, in Yee, all of the mobile park 
owners were asked to uniformly share the problem created when mobile 
tenants were frequently evicted and asked to move.90 Here, only a small 
subset of New York City landlords was asked to subsidize these hospi-
tals.91 
A. Defining the Boundaries of Rent Controls: Seawall Associates v.  
City of New York 
 Another New York case that helped to delineate the constitutional 
boundaries of rent controls was Seawall Associates v. City of New York.92 
This case stands for the proposition that a taking is more likely to have 
occurred where the state chooses to intervene before a landlord-tenant 
relationship has developed.93 In Seawall, the court determined that 
mandatory “rent-up” provisions violated the Fifth Amendment under 
both a physical takings and a regulatory takings analysis.94 The “rent-
                                                                                                                      
83 Id. 
84 Manocherian, 643 N.E.2d at 483. 
85 Id. at 484. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 486. 
89 Id. 
90 Manocherian, 643 N.E.2d at 486. 
91 Id. 
92 See generally 542 N.E.2d 1059 (N.Y. 1989). 
93 Id. at 1064. 
94 Id. at 1061. 
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up” provisions banned owners of single-room occupancy housing from 
demolishing such housing, and required upgrading all such housing to 
a habitable condition in which homeless individuals could reside.95 
Such “rent-ups” constituted a physical taking because “owners [were] 
forced to accept the occupation of their properties by persons not al-
ready in residence.”96 The Court of Appeals focused on the fact that 
this was not an instance of the government using its police powers to 
regulate an existing landlord-tenant relationship, but rather that the 
government created a landlord-tenant relationship and thereby effec-
tuated a physical taking.97 Actions where “the government authorize[d] 
the permanent occupation of the landlord’s property by a third party” 
were found to be unconstitutional.98 
 Furthermore, the landowners had not “voluntarily put their prop-
erties to use for residential housing.”99 The government forced this use 
on the landlords, effectively denying them the ability to use their land 
as they found appropriate.100 The court found that the government was 
violating two of the most basic property rights: the right to possess and 
the right to exclude.101 Further, the court made clear that a physical 
taking does not require “actual displacement of the owner’s possession 
through a fixed encroachment.”102 Rather, allowing strangers to occupy 
the landowner’s space was sufficient.103 
 The court found that even if a physical taking had not occurred, a 
regulatory taking most definitely did occur.104 “Rent-ups” not only de-
nied property owners the economically viable use of their property, but 
the provisions also failed to substantially advance legitimate state inter-
ests, as specified under the old Agins test.105 The “rent-ups” denied the 
owner an economically viable use of his property because they prohib-
ited the “sole use—entirely permissible before the enactment of the 
law—for which investment properties are purchased: commercial de-
velopment.”106 The law failed the public purpose prong of the test for 
                                                                                                                      
95 Id. at 1059. 
96 Id. at 1063. 
97 Id. at 1064. 
98 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 440 (1982). 
99 Seawall, 542 N.E.2d at 1064. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 1063. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 1065. 
105 Seawall, 542 N.E.2d at 1065. 
106 Id. at 1067. 
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lack of a nexus between the stated purpose and the means to accom-
plish that purpose.107 The purpose of the “rent-up” provisions was to 
provide and guarantee housing for the homeless.108 However, the sin-
gle-room occupancy housing was not specifically earmarked for home-
less people.109 Thus, while this law may have helped alleviate the gen-
eral problem of expensive housing in New York, it did nothing to 
specifically ameliorate the housing shortage for homeless citizens.110 
B. The Effect of Greystone Hotel Co. v. City of New York 
 A subsequent case, Greystone Hotel Co. v. City of New York, reiterated 
the point that the government has the authority to impose a rent con-
trol once an individual has made the decision to rent rooms.111 This 
case also illustrates the emphasis courts place on whether a landlord 
voluntarily opened his doors to business or was forced to do so.112 
 In Greystone, a hotel challenged a mandatory lease provision speci-
fying that “any occupant of [a] hotel may request a lease, and the hotel 
must grant a lease, with a term of at least six months for a rent not ex-
ceeding the legal regulated rent.”113 The U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York distinguished this case from Seawall by 
explaining that the mandatory lease provision requires that the hotel 
already have accepted the requestor-tenant as an occupant.114 There-
fore, unlike in Seawall—where a landlord-tenant relationship was being 
forced by the state actor—here the relationship was already created by 
the hotel owner.115 The court further found that the government’s 
regulation of the amount that the hotel owner could charge was a valid 
regulation of the landlord-tenant relationship as specified by New 
York’s police powers.116 Additionally, once a hotel owner opens his 
doors, he does not necessarily have the right to select his tenants.117 
Under a state’s police power, a state has the right to tell landlords 
which tenants to house, after the landlord has made the decision to 
                                                                                                                      
107 Id. at 1068. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 See generally 13 F. Supp. 2d 524 (S.D.N.Y 1998). 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 526. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Greystone Hotel, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 527. 
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house tenants.118 Therefore, the court found that none of New York’s 
actions rose to the level of a physical taking.119 
 The court further examined the regulatory takings issues, finding 
that no regulatory takings had occurred either.120 The court found a 
sufficient nexus between the state purpose of increasing affordable 
housing and the effect of the mandatory lease provisions.121 Moreover, 
the hotel owner was not deprived of an economically viable use.122 The 
court found that the hotel was still profitable, and that fact alone re-
vealed that the property still had an economically viable use.123 
 The fact that the Greystone Hotel was not as profitable as it would 
have been had all of the rooms remained hotel rooms was inconse-
quential, because “it is clear that the plaintiff has no constitutional right 
to what it could have received in an unregulated market.”124 Greystone’s 
holding appears to be in direct contravention to Seawall, where the 
court found that a regulatory taking had occurred because the land-
owner was preempted from using the land for the reason he purchased 
it, regardless of whether his use of it was still profitable.125 This juxtapo-
sition of the cases illustrates that courts will be more willing to find rent 
controls constitutional when they take on their traditional form: impos-
ing a regulation after a landlord-tenant relationship has been estab-
lished.126 However, courts are more likely to find controls unconstitu-
tional when they take on any new, expanded form, such as providing 
housing for hospital employees as in Manocherian or establishing a land-
lord-tenant relationship as in Seawall.127 
C. The Anticipated Demise of Rent Controls 
 As the above history of cases illustrates, courts have found rent 
controls and variations thereof unconstitutional under the Fifth 
                                                                                                                      
118 Id. (finding that “because [hotel owners] voluntarily open their property to occupa-
tion by others, petitioners cannot assert a per se right to compensation based on their in-
ability to exclude”). 
119 See id. 
120 Id. at 529. 
121 Id. at 528. 
122 Id. at 528–29. 
123 Greystone Hotel, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 527. 
124 Id. at 528. 
125 Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1067 (N.Y. 1989). 
126 Greystone Hotel, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 527. 
127 Manocherian v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 643 N.E.2d 479, 483 (N.Y. 1994); Seawall, 542 
N.E.2d at 1063. 
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Amendment for a variety of reasons.128 Yet, the Supreme Court has 
overruled much regulatory takings analysis through the rejection of the 
“substantially advances” test.129 The “substantially advances” test was 
hailed by many as the means by which rent controls would be consid-
ered unconstitutional, in recognition of the dire effects rent controls 
can have.130 Rent controls failed to “substantially advance” their stated 
goal of providing reasonably priced rental units for people with a low 
income.131 For example, many economists believe that a “dispropor-
tionate share” of the benefits of rent-controlled apartments go to the 
upper and middle class, not to the intented beneficiaries.132 Addition-
ally, rent controls often do not meet the goal of increasing the number 
of affordable housing units.133 For example, one study found that cities 
without rental controls typically increased their rental stock by five per-
cent to twenty percent over a ten-year period.134 Conversely, cities with 
rental control measures in place typically decreased their rental stock 
by eight percent to fourteen percent.135 In New York City, where hous-
ing is a consistent problem, rent controls have caused abandonment of 
many city properties along with a less plentiful and “more dilapidated” 
housing stock.136 
D. Rent Controls in Hawaii: Richardson v. City and County of Honolulu 
 Due to rent controls often failing to meet their intended purpose, 
many were anxiously awaiting the demise of rent controls under the 
“substantially advances” regime.137 In fact, the State of Hawaii had al-
ready abolished rent controls in Richardson v. City and County of Hono-
lulu.138 In that case, a rent control ordinance put a ceiling on the 
amount of rent the owner of land could charge the owner of a condo-
minium.139 As is often the case in Hawaii, the owner of a condominium 
may differ from the owner of the land on which the condominium 
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sits.140 The court found the rent control unconstitutional, relying on 
the Agins “substantially advances” test.141 The control did nothing to 
alleviate the housing shortage in Hawaii.142 Instead, because the rent 
control failed to “regulate resales,” the owners of the condominiums 
could essentially charge above market rates when they sold their con-
dominiums, because the buyers were assured that the rental rates for 
the land would not increase.143 Therefore, condominium sellers were 
“capturing the net present value of the reduced land rent in the form 
of a premium . . . .”144 Because the cause-and-effect relationship was 
essentially vitiated, the rent control was found unconstitutional.145 
E. Problems with Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. 
 Lingle is ripe with its own bevy of problems.146 For example, one of 
the factors it cites as necessary to determining whether a taking has oc-
curred is the “character of the government action . . . .”147 This factor 
was first established not in Lingle but in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. 
New York City, where the court specified that “a taking may more readily 
be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a 
physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from 
some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic 
life to promote the common good.”148 Such a definition was supposed 
to elucidate the concept of “character of government action.”149 How-
ever, this definition does not seem particularly determinative.150 Fur-
thermore, four years after the Penn Central decision, the Supreme Court 
declared that physical takings were per se unconstitutional, no longer 
requiring the application of the Penn Central balancing test and leading 
to further confusion over the meaning of “character of government 
action.”151 
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1. The “Character of Government Action” Factor Is Equivalent to the 
“Substantially Advances” Test 
 The “character of government action” test may be fundamentally 
concerned with ideas of justness and fairness, echoing Lingle’s warning 
that a regulatory taking analysis is fundamentally focused on “the sever-
ity of the burden that government imposes upon private property 
rights.”152 Alternatively, the “character of government action” test may 
be evaluating the “worthiness of the government’s regulatory pur-
pose.”153 Reciprocity, however, may be the key to a character of govern-
ment action analysis because one of the Court’s concerns is that one 
entity should not have to disproportionately shoulder a burden.154 The 
reasoning is that as long as an individual is either receiving a benefit or 
is being regulated for a problem that he helped to create, then a taking 
has not occurred.155 However, rent controls are often riddled with a lack 
of reciprocity: they “primarily . . . capture and transfer financial windfalls 
between private individuals.”156 Therefore, the character of the govern-
ment action is void of all reciprocity, since the landlord gains nothing.157 
2. “Character of Government Action” Is Different from the 
“Substantially Advances” Test 
 However, opponents of the idea that the “character of government 
action” should adopt the “substantially advances” test reason that mak-
ing policy decisions, such as the effectiveness of rent control, is better 
left to the legislatures.158 Moreover, some applaud the Lingle decision as 
providing a much needed distinction between the Fifth Amendment’s 
Takings Clause and the Due Process Clause.159 The Due Process Clause 
protects “life, liberty and property” and further specifies that no person 
shall be deprived of property without due process of the law.160 The 
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Due Process Clause has been widely held to prevent government behav-
ior that is arbitrary or does not pass a means-related-to-ends test.161 
 Therefore, before Lingle, there was no clear line demarcating the 
difference between the rights protected under the Takings Clause and 
those protected under the Due Process Clause, since both protected 
property against irrational government behavior.162 This problem was 
further compounded by the fact that different standards of review were 
applied to takings claims and due process claims.163 Takings claims are 
typically reviewed under the non-deferential standard of heightened 
scrutiny, and the government’s eminent domain claims are subjected to 
rigorous judicial review.164 Conversely, substantive due process claims are 
reviewed under the very deferential “arbitrary and capricious” stan-
dard.165 This further confused the differences between the two clauses— 
since they both were claimed to protect the same right, but they essen-
tially reviewed the government’s claims under different standards.166 
3. Lingle’s Focus on Individual Rights 
 Essentially, the Lingle ruling suggests that compensation is only 
necessary when individual rights have been harmed; that is, the gov-
ernment’s regulation has risen to the level of eviscerating “the owner’s 
right to exclude others from entering and using her property.”167 In fo-
cusing on the individual, the court found that the “substantially ad-
vances” test provides no indication of how a “burden is distributed among 
property owners.”168 Thus, only when the burden is higher on one indi-
vidual than on the rest should compensation be provided.169 
IV. Ambiguity of the Lingle Standard 
 In Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., the Supreme Court mandated that 
in evaluating if a regulatory taking had occurred, the “character of gov-
ernment action” was to be evaluated, not whether the regulation sub-
stantially advanced the government’s stated purpose.170 However, the 
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Court failed to provide a sufficiently clear definition for the “character 
of government action” test.171 In describing how to evaluate the charac-
ter of such an action, the Court merely stated that it should consider 
“whether [the government action] amounts to a physical invasion or 
instead merely reflects property interest through ‘some program adjust-
ing the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common 
good.’”172 However, since a regulatory taking by definition is not a 
“physical invasion,” the only relevant guidance for a regulatory taking is 
whether the action promotes the common good.173 After looking at why 
the Court rejected the Agins v. City of Tiburon “substantially advances” 
test, this Note argues that no substantive difference exists between the 
“character of government action” test and the “substantially advances” 
test. 
 The Court’s rejection of the “substantially advances” test is rooted 
in its reasoning that a regulatory takings analysis must be focused on 
individuals, not society.174 Agins’ “substantially advances” test was fo-
cused on society, not an individual, because the test looked to see if the 
government’s action substantially advanced its purpose in terms of so-
cietal goals.175 
A. Political Process Failure 
 Lingle’s rejection of the Agins’ standard is often cited to support 
the proposition that the Fifth Amendment should not be employed to 
correct political process failure.176 However, while one could argue this 
proposition, in practice the result of the Lingle and Agins tests are func-
tionally equivalent.177 
 Political process failure is when a government action fails to “pro-
tect a small group from exploitation by a larger number of beneficiar-
ies.”178 Arguably, rent controls could exhibit political process failure 
since they have the potential to exploit a small group—the property 
owners—for the good of the beneficiaries of rent controls.179 The “sub-
stantially advances” test does address the problem of political process 
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failure, since the scope of its view is broader than just the individual.180 
The test examines whether the control reaches a stated societal goal or 
if it exploits landlords by forcing them to shoulder a burden that soci-
ety as a whole should carry.181 
  However, Lingle’s rejection of political process failure is difficult to 
reconcile with the Court’s preoccupation of fairness, as evidenced by 
their continuous reference to burdens, explicitly stating that a takings 
analysis should focus on the “severity of the burden” the government 
imposes on individual landowners.182 However, political process failure 
often exhibits unfairness on an individual level. Even if political process 
failure and individual burden are theoretically different, in practice 
they are extremely similar because of the unfair effects upon a small 
societal group will migrate down to the individual members. This mi-
gration has the effect of disproportionally burdening individuals, which 
is a valid basis for finding a taking under Lingle.183 
B. The Holding of Chastleton After Lingle 
 In Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, the Supreme Court overturned rent 
controls which were enacted to lower rental values during World War 
I.184 At the end of the war, the Court found that the rent controls were 
no longer justified, stating “if all that remains of war conditions is the 
increased costs of living that is not in itself a justification of the [rent 
controls.]”185 Even though Chastleton preceded Agins, the Court’s mes-
sage was clear: rent controls are only to be allowed when furthering 
some societal goal.186 Moreover, the Court did not let the rent control 
stand under a state’s general police powers.187 The Court even went 
further to lay the foundation for Agins, finding that when a law is justi-
fied by a set of facts, the law is no longer justified if the facts on which 
it rests change.188 Therefore, as early as 1924, the Supreme Court had 
set forth the precedent that rent controls cannot be established ad 
hoc; they must be justified by some social condition or emergency.189 
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 By rejecting Agins’ “substantially advances” test, the Lingle Court 
found that rent controls do not have to be justified by social condi-
tions.190 However, the character of the government action must be 
taken in account.191 Lingle’s standard is whether the regulation is a pub-
lic program “adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to 
promote the common good.”192 The crucial word in this standard is 
“common,”193 which suggests that rent controls must be evaluated in 
light of what is good for all parties involved: both landlords and ten-
ants.194 Furthermore, the word “common” invokes images of reciprocity 
and fairness, because “common good” means that the good of more 
than one party is being considered.195 The Lingle Court was obviously 
quite concerned with fairness, since it explicitly mentions that property 
owners should not be forced to shoulder severe burdens.196 
 Therefore, if the Lingle standard were to be applied to Chastleton, 
the outcome of Chastleton would be the same.197 The rent controls in 
Chastleton were implemented to promote the common good of ensur-
ing available housing during wartime.198 However, when the war ended, 
the rent controls were essentially being used to promote nothing, since 
the common good of having housing during wartime had ceased to 
exist.199 When viewed in this light, the “character of government ac-
tion” test conforms to the “substantially advances” test.200 
 Moreover, even though the Lingle Court declared that they were 
only concerned with a regulation’s effect on individual property rights, 
they still employed a “common good” analysis.201 If the Court was so 
concerned with individual rights, they could have simply redefined the 
regulatory test to only be concerned with the government’s impact on 
the property owner, and the extent to which it interferes with her in-
vestment-backed expectations.202 There was no need to insert the 
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“common good” language, thus making the “character of government 
action” analysis very similar to a “substantially advances” one.203 
C. Penn Central’s Definition of “Character of Government Action”: 
Promotion of General Welfare 
 Penn Central defines the “character of government action” prong to 
be the ability of the action to generally promote societal welfare.204 In 
defining the “character of government action,” Penn Central recognizes 
the need to assess whether the government action accomplishes a 
broader good.205 Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City explic-
itly states that the character of the government action should be evalu-
ated to ascertain if the “health, safety, morals or general welfare would 
be promoted” by regulations.206 The word “promote” is synonymous 
with “advance.”207 Therefore, Penn Central’s use of the word “promote” 
implies that the government action must advance a purpose, that pur-
pose being health, safety, morals or general welfare.208 However, Penn 
Central sets a lower standard for measuring the successfulness of a regu-
lation.209 The regulation need only promote, not substantially promote, 
general welfare.210 Although promote is a weaker standard than “sub-
stantially advance,” promotion of general welfare is easier to accom-
plish than promotion of a stated, narrow goal.211 Penn Central explicitly 
specifies that the statute must “substantially further important public 
policies.”212 Therefore, while Lingle quotes Penn Central’s use of the term 
“character of the government action,” the Lingle Court fails to recog-
nize Penn Central’s requirement that the regulation promote some end, 
even if its standard is quite low.213 Lingle seems to imply that the charac-
ter of the government action should be viewed in a vacuum, independ-
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ent of the action’s ability to promote general welfare.214 Upon close ex-
amination of Penn Central, this is false.215 
1. Seawall Under Penn Central’s Weaker Standard 
 The “means-end” test as specified in Penn Central does not require 
as close a nexus as the Agins’ “substantially advances” test, because Penn 
Central merely requires that the regulation generally promote welfare, 
not the stated purpose of the regulation.216 Using this standard, the 
holding of Seawall Associates v. City of New York would not be different, 
because while the Seawall regulations failed to accomplish their stated 
purpose, they did promote the general public good.217 
 In Seawall, mandatory “rent-up” provisions forced property owners 
to make available vacant apartments for homeless housing.218 However, 
these units were put into a general pool for single room occupancy 
units and were not specifically earmarked for homeless people.219 Due 
to this lack of earmarking, the regulation failed to accomplish its stated 
goal, thus effectuating a taking.220 
 Under Lingle, Seawall’s regulations must be evaluated without con-
sidering whether it advances the purpose of providing housing for the 
homeless.221 Lingle would reason that such an inquiry of advancement 
is better left for a due process claim.222 However, under a Penn Central 
analysis, the question would seem to be whether the regulation in Sea-
wall substantially furthers an important public policy.223 The meaning 
of an “important public policy” is unclear.224 If important public policy 
is defined as the stated goal of the regulation, then Seawall would be no 
different after Lingle.225 However, if “important public policy” is any im-
portant public policy, then by generally providing affordable housing, 
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the Seawall regulation would pass the “character of government action” 
prong.226 
D. Manocherian After Lingle: Burden Is a Relative Term and “Character of 
Government Action” Examines Individual Burdens 
 Manocherian v. Lenox Hill Hospital highlights the fact that a regula-
tion’s purpose and the burden it places on individual landowners are 
often inextricably intertwined.227 In Manocherian, a New York regulation 
required property owners to offer renewal leases on rent-stabilized 
apartments to employees of not-for-profit hospitals.228 The court distin-
guished this regulation from general rent control and stabilization regu-
lations by finding that these hospital-specific regulations failed to ad-
vance a “closely and legitimately connected State interest.”229 These 
regulations did not protect apartment dwellers from an overheated 
rental market.230 Instead, they provided an employment perk to a very 
small segment of the rental population, employees of not-for-profit hos-
pitals.231 
 The court found that not only was the regulation’s purpose inva-
lid, but also the landowners were forced to shoulder the burden of the 
hospitals.232 The court reasoned that employers should provide em-
ployment perks, not individual landlords.233 The court’s reasoning was 
clear: because the purpose of the regulation was not valid, the burden 
it placed on the landowners was excessive.234 If the regulation’s purpose 
had been to provide rent-stabilized units to the general population that 
could not otherwise afford such units, the court would have deemed 
such a purpose valid.235 In that case, the burden on the individual 
property owners would not have been excessive.236 The different out-
comes illustrate that a property owner’s burden must not be viewed in 
absolute terms. 237 The same burden may rise to the level of a taking 
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depending on the reason behind the imposition of the burden. The 
burden on the individual is colored by the purpose of the regulation.238 
 In a post-Lingle world, the Manocherian ruling would not be affected 
because Manocherian examines the nature of the stated purpose, not 
whether that purpose substantially advances a stated goal.239 Manocherian 
examines the burden placed on the individual landowners, a perspec-
tive that Lingle clearly condoned.240 Therefore, Manocherian provides 
one possible interpretation for Lingle’s “character of government action” 
factor, namely whether the government action constitutes a valid public 
purpose.241 Such an interpretation would be consistent with Lingle’s 
mandate that a determination of the character of the government ac-
tion should be based on whether it promotes a “common good.”242 
E. Lingle and Untraditional Rent Controls 
 Courts have been more amenable to overturning non-traditional 
rent controls: those that differ from the model of imposing a rent ceil-
ing once the landlord has already made the decision to rent out his 
units.243 This tendency is the result of a judicial recognition that using 
traditional rent controls to protect consumer welfare is a valid use of a 
state’s police power.244 In contrast, non-traditional rent regulations have 
typically been held unconstitutional because they often impose a 
greater burden on landowners.245 For example, the Seawall regulation 
was found unconstitutional because it forced landowners to accept ten-
ants, thus straying from the accepted model of policing rental amounts 
once a tenant was already accepted.246 This non-traditional form of rent 
control imposed a very high burden on the individual landowners.247 
Additionally, in Richardson v. City and County of Honolulu, a regulation 
that imposed a ceiling on the amount of rent that could be charged for 
the land on which condominiums sat was found to be unconstitutional 
                                                                                                                      
238 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542–44 (2005). 
239 Manocherian, 643 N.E.2d at 484. 
240 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539; Manocherian, 643 N.E.2d at 484. 
241 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539; Manocherian, 643 N.E.2d at 484. 
242 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539. 
243 Richardson v. City of Honolulu, 124 F.3d 1150, 1166 (9th Cir. 1997); Seawall Assocs. 
v. City of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1067 (N.Y. 1989). 
244 Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1988). 
245 See Seawall, 542 N.E.2d at 1067. 
246 Id. 
247 See id. at 1068. 
384 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 34:361 
because it failed to have the effect of actually making the rent of the 
condominiums more affordable.248 
 A regulation imposes a greater burden on an individual when that 
regulation fails to accomplish its stated purpose.249 If the “character of 
government action” were interpreted simply to mean a valid public 
purpose, without regard to individuals, then presumably the cases of 
Seawall and Richardson would turn out differently.250 However, Lingle 
explicitly mandates that the burden on an individual property owner 
must be considered.251 In Seawall, the public purpose of providing more 
housing for the homeless is considered valid.252 Furthermore, in 
Richardson, the public purpose of providing more affordable housing is 
considered valid.253 Yet, the Seawall and Richardson regulations, while 
having a valid public purpose, were held unconstitutional because they 
failed to accomplish their stated purpose.254 Uncoincidentally, these 
cases involve variations of the classic form of rent control.255 Courts 
have implicitly reasoned that when a regulation fails to accomplish its 
stated purpose the burden imposed on the individual landowner is 
greater than if the regulation were successful.256 The burden in abso-
lute terms is the same regardless of whether the regulation substantially 
advances its stated purpose.257 That is, independent of a regulation’s 
success, if a landowner has a rental ceiling of seven hundred dollars a 
month, then that burden is constant.258 However, if the burden placed 
on the landowner is viewed not in absolute terms but in qualitative 
ones, then a burden is greater if it is being created for no reason.259 
Therefore, Lingle’s focus on an individual’s burden implicitly evaluates 
a regulation’s effectiveness, because ineffective regulations place a 
higher burden on individuals.260 
 The crux of the Lingle argument is that the constitutionality of 
regulatory takings should focus on the burdens the regulations im-
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posed on individual landowners.261 Regulations which inappropriately 
and overly burden landowners are unconstitutional.262 Therefore, regu-
lations that fail to accomplish their stated purpose place a dispropor-
tionately large burden on landowners.263 As such, these regulations 
must be declared unconstitutional.264 Under this reasoning, the charac-
ter of the government action in imposing rent controls may be invalid 
because rent controls often fail to accomplish their goal of providing 
affordable housing for lower income individuals.265 This failure results 
in a larger burden imposed on owners of rent-controlled buildings.266 
Accordingly, when this burden becomes disproportionate, rent controls 
should be considered unconstitutional.267 
Conclusion 
 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. mandates that a regulatory taking 
which disproportionately burdens an individual must be considered 
unconstitutional. The character of the government’s action is central to 
the burden inquiry. Part of the character of the government action in-
quiry should focus on whether the regulations accomplish their goals. 
Further, regulations that fail to accomplish their stated purpose impose 
a larger burden on individuals than regulations that accomplish their 
goals. Burdens must therefore be viewed in relative, not absolute, 
terms. This burden should also be considered when examining the 
character of the government action. Regulations which fail to accom-
plish their stated purpose must be declared unconstitutional, because 
they impose large burdens on those they regulate. 
 Rent controls often fail to accomplish their stated purpose of pro-
viding affordable housing to lower income individuals. As such, the 
relative burden that the regulations impose on landowners whose 
buildings are subject to rent controls is disproportionately large. This 
burden necessitates the result that the character of the government 
action is unacceptable. Due to this burden, rent controls may be found 
unconstitutional. 
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